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1 The meaning of gainful trade
1.1  Prelude
The verbal statement ‘trade is gainful’ may sound innocent and even seem obviously true.
Indeed, the standard textbook presentation of trade theory does assert that trade is gainful. This is
done without much discussion, probably because its validity seems self-evident.
However, a verbal statement may not reveal its  deeper significance, and its far-reaching and
wide-ranging implications. When stated formally, the concept of gainful trade leads to a new
economic theory, with many results not expected by prevailing economics. It is verily different
from classical and neoclassical economic theory. The familiar pictures either disappear or take
totally new appearances, and hitherto unseen pictures emerge.
It would be quite unpleasant and ultimately futile to first discuss and criticize the previous
literature in order to justify the new. Instead, it is much easier and more pleasant to just go ahead
with the new economics from scratch. It is an exciting journey of discovery. One sees how
simple it is to fuse micro and macroeconomics in a unified body of theory. One sees formerly
intractable issues becoming plain and simple. This may be one rewarding journey.
1.2  Trade is gainful
The idea that trade is gainful is the starting point for the standard presentation of the theory of
trade. Thus suppose that Crusoe lives in an isolated island. He lives under subsistence (autarky),
until somehow a relation is established with a neighboring island of Defoe. Crusoe produces and
consumes Fruits (F) and Grains (G) before trade.
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Figure  1: Gains from trade
In Figure 1, Crusoe’s autarkic production and consumption of  (F, G) occur at point A at utility
level U
2. But once trade with Defoe is possible, he shifts production to point B but consumptionM Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 2
to point C. While production is still on his production possibility frontier (PPF), his consumption
is outside the frontier. At world prices, his budget line allows him to reach the highest possible
utility level U
3, outside his PPF.  His gains from trade may be expressed in terms of opportunity
cost and price. He exports F
x = (Fb – Fc) and imports G
m = (Gc - Gb). Crusoe’s opportunity cost of
F
x is (G*- Gb) under autarky, but he makes a net profit (Gc – G*) by trade. The gain from trade is
positive [(Gc – G*) >0]
1.2.1  Measurement of gains
It is worth repeating that the gain made by Crusoe from the trade with Defoe has been shown in
two ways. First, it is a shift from a lower utility level U
1 to a higher utility level U
3. Second, it is
a net profit measured in units of output (Gc – G*). To measure the gains from trade, these two
ways will help, as shown in Chapter 3 on Value
1.2.2  Formal statement of gains
The idea that trade is gainful may be called Menger Dictum in honor of Carl Menger (1871) who
recognized this explicitly. He need not be the first to have done so. The honor is for his
subjectivism: the gain must be ultimately understood in terms of human intentions. It is not
necessary for the gain to come from increased material output, but it is necessary that the utility
be increased.
In the trade between Crusoe and Defoe, let Crusoe sell Fruits (F) and buy Grains (G). Let U




x)  <  U
Crusoe (G
m)      {Menger Dictum}
The dictum just says that Crusoe prefers what he buys (imports) to what he sells (exports). The




x)]>0 is necessary for trade, but not sufficient. The
other necessary part is the ‘anomaly’ in the original endowment of the goods, such that the
individual prefer what he does not possess to what he does. Consider three possible scenarios:
1.2.2.1  Scenario 1: Peaceful coexistence without trade
Crusoe prefers fruits to grains, and already has the fruits. Defoe prefers grains to fruits and
already has the grains. Trade is not possible, because there is no available gains. Both remain in
subsistence, and co-exist peacefully.
1.2.2.2  Scenario 2: Violent war
Crusoe prefers fruits to grains and has the fruits. Defoe also prefers fruits to grains, but has the
grains. Crusoe cannot gain from trade, and indeed must endure a loss. So he refuses to trade.
Defoe stands to gain if Crusoe would give the fruits. But as Crusoe refuses, Defoe may undertake
plunder. Resistance to plunder imposes a cost, and the rational decision compares the costs and
benefits. Trade is preferred to war if the cost of paying is lower than the cost of plundering.
1.2.2.3  Scenario 3: Peaceful trade
Crusoe prefers grains to fruits, but has fruits. Defoe prefers fruits to grains, but has grains. Trade
is possible, because it is gainful for both. There is an anomaly in endowments. Without this, theM Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 3
opposite preferences alone would not lead to trade, as in Scenario 1. Also note that something
must be present to ensure the seller’s right to get payment.
1.3  Allocation model denies gains!
The main body of microeconomics apparently denies the existence of gainful trade. A core belief
in microeconomics is that in equilibrium, the net profit is zero. To dispute this core theorem, one
must dispute much in microeconomics. Instead, let us accept the Menger Dictum as an axiom
and see where it takes us. One can then look back at previous economics and decide if it is right.
It is possible to resolve the apparent contradiction between the trade model and the core idea of
zero equilibrium profit, if a clear distinction is made between allocation by an optimizer and an
exchange by an entrepreneur. The issue may be clarified with Figure 2.  It is really the same as
Figure 1, except for deletion and addition of some curves.
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Figure 2: Income effect of trade
Here, points B and A belong to the same PPF. The straight line passing through both B and A
can be seen as the domestic resource budget. Crusoe could reallocate resources to produce an
extra amount (Ga - Gb). His ability to reach point C at world prices may therefore be said to have
a price effect, by making G cheaper abroad than at home. By standard practice, the price effect is
split into an income effect and a substitution effect. The income effect shifts the budget line
outward to reach point C, giving a net gain of (Gc – Ga). The substitution effect (Gc – Gb) is a shift
from a lower utility level at point B to a higher utility level at point C, along the budget line
given by the world prices.
While the Slutsky decomposition of a price effect into an income effect and a substitution effect
is a standard part of microeconomics, the income effect seems to be promptly forgotten. It also
loses sight of entrepreneurship.
This happens by way of imputation of the income effect in the budget constraint.  At world
prices, the marginal cost of exports F
x  is [(G c – Ga) + (Ga – Gb )]  rather than just (Ga – Gb),M Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 4
because it imputes the net income (Gc – Ga) to the factors. A movement along the budget line
does not change the income.
The imputation of the pure entrepreneurial income from trade seems to take place without clear
awareness. The standard supply function does not specify a fixed factor endowment, but merely
fixed factor prices. The world price of course already includes the net income effect. The
imputation presumes that the firm can procure the factors from the market at the given factor
prices. This effectively removes the factor endowment constraint, because there is nothing to
ensure that global factor endowments are not exceeded.  It means that the imputation of net
income and the presumption of the firm’s ability to buy factors hides the gains from trade.
For theoretical progress, it is necessary to recognize the income effect and acknowledge the
presence of net profit in equilibrium. It is also necessary to take note of the risk of loss taken by
the supplier. Crusoe’s optimal production is at point A under autarky, but he moves to point B,
which is inferior in terms of utility, in the expectation of successful trade. If for some reason
Crusoe is unable to sell the output meant for export, he will suffer a net loss. In a dynamic
model, the possibility of net losses in equilibrium adjustment must be acknowledged. The
possibility of losses must be an integral part of a  proper model of business cycle.
The analytical issue raised by the presence of pure entrepreneurial gain is that this cannot be
explained with an allocation model. The net gain has no cost or budget constraint. It is a free
bonus from trade. Its analysis must be based on entrepreneurship. That cannot be done with the
tool of optimization analysis. There is a need for a new analytical tool.
The challenge for the new analytical tool is to reconcile the balance in the budget with the
imbalance in utility between points B and C. The market value of exports F
x must be the same as
that of the imports G
m, and yet the imports must yield higher utility than the exports. Thus, let V
denote the market value. Hence let V(F
x) = Pf F
x  where Pf is price of F. Then it must be true that
both of the following relations hold:
V (F
x)  =   V (G
m) {Equivalence     }
U (F
x)  <   U (G
m)      { Crusoe’s gains}
The literature recognizes the substitution effect of moving along the same budget line, which
keeps the budget intact and yet allows the consumer to move to a higher level of utility. Despite
the clear recognition that the same budget line passes through many levels of utility, the idea that
two baskets of the same market value may have different utility levels seems incredible on first
intuition. The allocation model’s habit of thinking is that if there is any further gains to be made,
then the optimizer can seize it by changing the demand or supply until all opportunities for gain
are exhausted. Apparently, the thinking is that if the marginal utility of G is higher than that of F,
the optimal response must be to increase the supply of F  (= reduce consumption) and the
demand for G (= increase consumption) until the gap in marginal utility disappears. This
allocation is not possible, because the agent is already on the boundary of the PPF.  This thinking
ignores that the choice of producing at B and consuming at C is already optimal. It forgets that
the original endowment was anomalous, and trade has created gains by virtue of a move to point
C from point B.M Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 5
1.3.1  The challenge of Pareto Optimality
There is apparently some loss of memory of the whole exercise on splitting the price effect. This
happens because an exercise in the moral quality of plunder, despite not being a part of economic
analysis of exchange, came to occupy a permanent place in the consciousness of
microeconomics. This is the notion of Pareto Optimality, originally formulated before the
Slutsky decomposition of the price effect.
The task before Pareto Optimality is to evaluate the welfare effect of a transfer of wealth from
one individual to another. A properly formulated model of transfer would look into the
institutional context. In politics, taxpayers are plundered to feed the recipients of subsidy. There
must be some political rationale to judge the merit of one-way transfers. Pareto Optimality did
not see the issue as one of politics. Instead, it looked for some kind of economic optimum in
which transfers may give benefits to some, as long as nobody is burdened with a loss. The result
of the search is that there is a social optimum in which the parties neither gain nor lose anything.
This social equilibrium fulfills Pareto Optimality. In it, the ratio of marginal utilities is the same
for all individuals, since everybody equalizes it with the given ratio of market prices. Let the




Defoe = (pf/pg) [Pareto Optimality]
In a standard allocation exercise, Crusoe would maximize U
Crusoe(F, G)+λ(I- pfF –pgG). The first
order condition for utility maximization gives
(uf/λ)=pf ; and (ug/λ)=pg or (uf/ug)= (pf/pg)
There is no harm in redefining the physical units so that the price ratio is 1, giving (uf/ug)=1 or
uf  =  ug
Notice also that since the entire sale of F
x is against the entire bundle of G
m, it is proper to regard
the associated utility as marginal utility, namely
U (F
x)= uf ; U(G
m)= ug ;
Then the contrast  is  evident from putting the Menger Dictum and Pareto Optimality side by side
Menger Dictum for Crusoe: uf  <  ug
Menger Dictum for Defoe:  uf  >  ug
Pareto Optimality for both: uf  =  ug
It is not possible to reconcile the above without changing the theory of price so that it allows
income effects for both buyers and sellers! Let us suspend the issue here, and come back to it
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1.3.2  Can all parties gain?
The Menger Dictum applies to all individuals. The participation in exchange is not costless- it
imposes transaction costs. Hence it is unlikely that exchange can occur even if one party finds it
gainful while the other party merely gets a zero benefit. It is generally not possible, because
exchange must necessarily occur between strangers who are not friends, and who cannot play a
futile game merely to let somebody else win. Why transfers between members of family and
friends cannot be regarded as exchange will be discussed in Chapter 2.
If exchange is gainful for both parties, the following must be true for Crusoe and Defoe.
U
Crusoe (F
x)  <   U
Crusoe (G
m)     {Crusoe’s gain}
U
Defoe   (F
x)  >   U
Defoe  (G
m)      {Defoe’s   gain}
The above relations together define what is known as double coincidence. Jevons (1868) used
the term, but its verbal meaning was soon repudiated by the formal statement of Pareto
Optimality. Verbally, there is a double coincidence of wants in barter, if the good sold by the
first agent is bought by the second and vice-versa. But its formal meaning was not available.
Double coincidence, stated formally as above, immediately reveals an inconsistency in the
preference orders of the two agents. The intuitive reaction is to reject double coincidence for this
apparent inconsistency.
1.4  Consistency of choice
The most important challenge to the double coincidence relation (Menger Dictum) comes from
the highly remarkable idea known as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, which is a generalization
of Pareto Optimality. The theme is that it is impossible to formulate a social welfare function due
to the linear inconsistency of preferences of different individual members of society. In short,
double coincidence is inconsistent!
The rationality of an individual’s choice may be defined by linear consistency or transitivity. For
example, let three points x, y and z lie on a line. Now, if x is preferred to y, and y is preferred to
z, then x must be preferred to z.  Let an arrow show the direction of preference. The line below
shows linear consistency:
z     y x
Figure 3: Linear consistency
In an indirect exchange with three or more agents, each with preferences inconsistent with
others, it is indeed impossible to get linear consistency of social choice. However, as explained
in detail later, indirect exchange does take place with rational choice of each agent. It does give
the most preferred good to each agent, and hence it does maximize social welfare. And it does
reveal social choice. All these happen without linear consistency. This may mean that the linear
viewpoint of one agent may not properly judge a social decision. Another notion of consistency
may be appropriate to study social choice. That notion may be called circular consistency, as
represented by a circle.M Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 7
In a circular consistency, the two ends of the line are joined to make a circle. The result is that if
x is preferred to y, and y is preferred to z, then z is preferred to x. It sounds illogical and
impossible at first, like the clock’s dial, where 1 comes after 12 and also before 12. But the dial
cannot work unless the day begins where the night ends and vice-versa. The day’s 2 PM cannot
be later than the day’s 3 PM, but it can be later than the night’s 3 AM. The independence of the
day from the night, coupled with the continuation is the clue to circular consistency.
         x
     z 
                                           y
Figure 4: Circular consistency
Is circular consistency rational or logical? To search for an answer,  a critical distinction must be
made between the allocation decision of one agent and the exchange decision of many agents.
The logical distinction is that the social decision may ignore the preferences of uninterested
agents. There are three steps to see this. The first step recognizes that social decision is a sum of
different parts made by different agents. The second step sees that each part ignores the agents
who neither buy nor sell. The third step shows that each part has linear consistency, and yet
when all parts are joined, the joint decision does not have linear consistency.
The logical issue is to consider the relevance of the preference of agents who neither buy nor
sell. If the preferences of agents who neither buy nor sell can be ignored, then circular
consistency is logical. To explore the issues, one may begin with linear consistency and see
where it stops. One then proceeds further with a different notion of consistency.
Linear consistency defines rational choice from the viewpoint of a single agent. The simplest
way to see its limitation is to consider an example of indirect exchange. Let there be 3 agents A,
B and C who want to buy and sell three goods (x, y, z) among themselves. Let U denote the
utility of the good to the agent as indicated by a superscript. Let the preference orders of the
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In the example, each agent has linear consistency. However, the group decision on social choice
based on a unanimous majority of 3 cannot be formed at all. Next, a coalition of 2 cannot lead to
linear consistency. A majority (A+B) prefers (x) to (y), a majority (B+C) prefers (y) to (z), and a
majority (A+C) prefers (z) to (x). This means that there is no linear consistency. Indeed, each
coalition fails to have linear consistency. Thus coalition (A+B)  prefers x to y, but finds z bothM Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 8
superior and inferior to x or y or both. Coalition (B+C) finds x both superior and inferior to z and
y. Coalition (A+C) finds y both superior and inferior to x and z.
What limits linear consistency? The two ends of the line are open, one missing a buyer and
the other missing a seller. Thus, for the coalition (A+B), the line (y            x     z     ) indicates that y
has no buyer and z has no seller. If a third agent C joins them as both a buyer of y and a seller of
z, then the points y and z must be connected such that y is preferred to z, giving circular
consistency. In short, a linear consistency cannot possibly describe an exchange where all goods
are both bought and sold. It cannot describe even direct exchange between two agents. Thus if A
prefers z to x and C prefers x to z, the two agents can do barter, but linear consistency fails. The
agents must ignore each other’s preference if they want to get what they prefer.
       x      z
Figure 5: Circular consistency in barter
In indirect exchange, the preference orders reveal that each good is most preferred by one agent,
least preferred by another agent and weakly preferred in between by the owner. In the example,
the most preferred goods are z for A, x for B and y for C. But z, x and y are least preferred by B,
C and A respectively. Linear consistency cannot possibly describe the same good being least
preferred and most preferred in the same choice. And yet every agent is acting rationally. Their
social decision is to be deemed rational if it gives the most preferred good to each agent. This is
just what indirect exchange actually does: it gives each agent the good most preferred by that
agent.  This happens despite and because of the fact that each good is least preferred by one of
the agents while it is most preferred by another.
The preference of the agent who finds the good least preferred is irrelevant, because that agent
neither buys nor sells the good. It is impossible to assure linear consistency if the preference of
the irrelevant agent is included. But if the preference of the uninterested agent is ignored, there is
no reason to seek linear consistency. The concerned agents can take a direction of preference
opposite to that of the unconcerned agent. This leads to circular consistency. Logically, if every
good is both more preferred to one good and less preferred to yet another good, then they all
belong to a circle. In a circle, each point is both higher and lower to any other point in any
direction. A circle has no endpoint while a line has endpoints.
To explore circular consistency, the following concepts are needed: ruling coalition, changing
composition of ruling coalition leading to changing direction of preference, dominance of ruling
coalition, strong and weak preference, and exit of the uninterested agent.
Ruling coalition: The ruling coalition consists of the buyers and sellers. It makes the decision
on what and how much is exchanged between whom. It excludes or ignores other agents who are
neither buyers nor sellers.
Changing composition of the ruling coalition: After a decision to exchange one good is
made, the buyers leave the coalition. They are not interested in the decisions on other goodsM Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 9
which they neither buy nor sell. The seller of the earlier coalition remains, and becomes the
buyer of the next good. The sellers of the next good join the new coalition. Consider good x.
Agent B wants to buy it while agent A wants to sell it. The ruling coalition is formed with A and
B. It does not include C or ignores C, as C is neither the buyer nor the seller of x. The decision is
made so that A sells x to B. Then B leaves the coalition and C enters. Now, the job is to decide
on the good z. A wants to buy it and C wants to sell it. The decision is made so that C sells z to
A. Then A leaves the market, having both bought z and sold x, and having no interest in y. But C
wants to buy y and B wants to sell y. They form a coalition. The  decision is made so that B sells
y to C. All trades are completed by the three successive coalitions.
The result of the social decision is to give each agent the good most preferred by that agent. The
important point is that the social decision on all three goods has been made by successive partial
decisions with different ruling coalitions. Each individual and coalition behaves rationally. The
process is rational as it gives each agent the most preferred good.
Dominance of coalition: Buyers dominate the coalition because they have the strongest
preference for the good being considered for exchange. They get support from the sellers. The
dominant agent chooses the direction of preference with the support of the seller. Buyers must
overlook the preferences of irrelevant agents who dislike the good.
Strong and weak preference: The agent with the strong preference for the good is the buyer.
Strong preference means that the buyer has no other good preferred to the one being bought. The
seller’s preference is weak, but consistent with the buyer’s direction of preference. The term
weak preference implies that the seller prefers some other good to the one being sold. For
example, both A and B prefer x to y, but B prefers it strongly, while A prefers it weakly. A wants
z strongly.  The coalition has a segment over which the preferences overlap, so that they move in
the same direction. The strong preference implies buying while weak preference implies selling.
In short, the coalition is pair of a buyer and a seller of one good.
Exit of the uninterested agent: The agent who is neither a buyer nor a seller voluntarily leaves
the coalition. It means that the preference of this uninterested agent can be ignored. The direction
of preference is reversed due to the exit of the uninterested agent. If the agent refuses to exit,
involuntary unemployment occurs due to a blockade from the irrelevant agent. (See Chapter 5)
The process of making a social decision may be shown by the three successive coalitions. Shown
below are the preferences of two agents in a coalition. In each coalition the solid line shows
where the preferences match. At the tail end, there is one good that is less preferred by one agent
which is more preferred by the other. There is no linear consistency except in the middle
segment.
Coalition (B +A):
        z            y             x                 z
Coalition (B +C):
        x            z             y               x  
Coalition (A +C):
        y            x                  z   yM Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 10
   
It is possible to show how these coalitions can make partial decisions on one good at a time.
They can successively make decisions on all goods. The combination of the partial decisions
lead to a social decision with circular consistency. By successively adding the coalition lines as
sides of a triangle, one gets a triangle of choice in a 3-good exchange. The circle is its
generalization.
On each side of the triangle, there are two goods over which two agents have the same order of
preference, but they have an opposite order of preference over a third good.
              y              x
z
z                y                    x             z
         x              y
Figure 6: Social choice
Thus (y→x→z) of A coincides with (z→y→x) of B only on segment (y→x) on the line
z→y→x→z. The line (y→x→z) of A matches with line (x→z→y) of C in segment (x→z) on
line y→x→z→y. Lastly, agent C’s (x→z→y) matches segment (z→y) with agent B’s (z →y→x)
on line x→z→y→x. The matching segments (y→x), (x→z) and (z→x) together constitute
circular consistency, but violate linear consistency.
      
z
          y     x
Figure 7: Triangles and circles of choice
The idea is that the society may ignore the preference of the agent who neither buys nor sells. In
Figure 6, the tail of the coalition’s preference line comes from the preference of the agent who
does not buy or sell the product. That preference is irrelevant. The tail can be chopped off.
Circular consistency means that every good has both a buyer and a seller. But a buyer has a
strong preference for it, while the seller has a weak preference. Therefore for each good, there is
one good more preferred and another good less preferred to it. For this to happen to every good,
it must be so that each good is both more preferred and less preferred. It is logical, because each
good is less preferred to one good but more preferred to a different good. In isolation, each good
meets linear consistency. Also, each agent’s preference has linear consistency. But the
combination lacks linear consistency. This happens because the uninterested agent’s preferenceM Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 11
can be ignored or reversed. If everybody has acted rationally, then the social decision must be
rational. Indeed, it would not be rational to judge the merit of a decision according to the
preferences of the agents who are not concerned with the decision.
To sum up the discussion, a single agent’s linear viewpoint is not suitable to study social
decisions. There is no need for independent agents to have the same preference order. As long
each agent can act rationally to participate in social decision, the social choice is rational.
Circular consistency is required to describe social choice such that each good has both a buyer
and a seller. Without this circularity, there would be one good without a buyer and another
without a seller at the two endpoints of the line. That would fail one seller and one buyer. Linear
consistency would not reveal social choice or maximize welfare or establish equilibrium.
1.4.1  Arrow’s Impossibility theorem
It is important to notice that Arrow sought to solve a problem that does not exist in economics. It
is not a problem for society to choose only one good out of many when different people prefer
different goods. There is nothing wrong with producing every kind of good. Diversity of goods is
a market fact.
Even the political issue of choosing a single leader out of many candidates is misleading. If in a
society there are different voting blocks supporting many different candidates with no clear
choice for one leader, an efficient solution is a parliament where many leaders represent the
many blocks. The problem of choosing a single leader for the whole nation has no parallel in
economic analysis of allocation or exchange. Even in politics, the scenario with multiple
candidates or parties with divided loyalties means lack of political equilibrium, and may involve
fragile governments built on unstable coalitions. If the underlying preferences of people display a
divided society, there is no a priori reason to propose a centralized society rather than a
confederation. But that is not an economist’s task.
Neither does culture present a problem of a whole society choosing a singular ideal. The history
of culture is a history of diversity. In the end, the monomaniac search for a single good or a
single leader or a single cultural norm for a whole society animated by a single mind may be
misguided.
The real economic problem is the existence of an anomaly in endowment so that an individual
may prefer something that does not belong to him or her. The problem for society is to find out
how best to organize a transfer of goods to those who desire them most out of a given collection
of goods, from those who rank the same goods on a lower scale but happen to own them. Thus if
agent A prefers x most but owns y, while B prefers y most but owns z, and C prefers z most but
owns x, then it is not a problem of deciding which of the three goods the whole society should
consume. The problem is to allow A to have x in exchange for y, B to have y in exchange for z,
and C to have z in exchange for x. Arrow is thinking of an allocation problem in place of an
exchange problem. In an allocation problem, one single individual controls the choices. In an
exchange problem, several independent agents have their own preferences such that they may or
may not find options for gainful exchange.M Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 12
It is important to recognize the institutional background of exchange and plunder. A political
authority may impose taxes and provide subsidies according to some political rationale. May be
politics considers some balancing of power through one-way transfers. Economics has nothing to
say about political acts of one-way transfer of wealth.
More importantly, economic science has no reason to study welfare as such. Exchange happens
to be gainful, whether one likes it or not. The focus on welfare imports value judgments and
violates the sanctity of science. The job of science is to explain, and not judge.
Economics can deal only with voluntary exchange in which the buyer pays instead of plundering
the seller.  Arrow’s theorem does not clarify who owns the resources and why many agents must
make a single choice. Even if the resources were jointly owned, the solution would lie in
producing all three goods according to some rule to decide who gets how much. To set up the
allocation problem properly, the budget of each agent must be specified. Arrow’s theorem does
not specify the budget. Sen (1982) sees the issue correctly as a political one of entitlement.
1.4.2  Double coincidence is necessary
The notion of circular consistency says that it is logically valid to admit the existence of double
coincidence in exchange.  The linear inconsistency is not a problem. Indeed, it is necessary for
trade to be gainful for both parties. As shown later, money arises as an artificial means of
payment  to fulfill the double coincidence requirement.  This changes all of macroeconomics. It
has special relevance for central issues of economic policy on (involuntary) unemployment,
(unintended) indebtedness and (undue) instabilities unrelated to tastes, technologies, and
endowments.
1.5  Axioms of consistent economics
The new body of economic theory may be called consistent economics in view of the critical role
played by the notion of consistent choice. This new economics stands on two axioms of gainful
trade.
1.5.1  First axiom: Menger dictum
The theme that trade is gainful for both the buyer and the seller of each good is taken as an
axiom called Menger Dictum. This is expressed formally as the condition of double coincidence.
To derive the implications of the Menger dictum, the need is to extend the analysis of choice
over varying kinds of goods of given value. This leads to a new model of exchange in which
choices have two dimensions: over varying quantities of goods of given kind, and over varying
kinds of goods of given value. The formal analysis requires notions of offer, acceptance, and
(single, double, multiple) coincidence to deal with the choice over kinds.
1.5.2  Second axiom: Circular consistency
The notion of gains for both parties cannot make sense without the notion of circular consistency
of choice.  This notion defines a rational outcome for social choice. This leads to a unified model
in which individual choices are combined to arrive at social choice. This opens up a new vista
and provides a new analytical tool . This tool may be called consistency analysis.M Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 13
1.6  Allocation versus exchange
If economics must acknowledge that trade is gainful, it must make a clear distinction between
allocation and exchange. The following four dimensions of the distinction may give a clue to the
development of a tool to analyze exchange. These are (1) character of consistency in choice; (2)
the presence of pure entrepreneurial gains and risks of loss; (3) the presence of artificial
payments in indirect exchange and (4) the presence of intermediation.
1.6.1  Character of consistency in choice
Individual choice gives the individual total control on the choices over substitutes  in
allocation. However, social choice gives the individual partial control over non-substitutes in
exchange. The three distinguishing elements are: preference relations between the goods
(substitutes or not); degree of control (total or partial), and the integrity of the good (whether or
not the buyers and sellers have agreed on the kind and quantity of the good).
1.6.1.1  Preference relations between goods
The first distinction between substitutes and non-substitutes shows why the equilibrium
conditions under allocation must differ from those under exchange. Under allocation, an
individual chooses among alternatives. The distinction in kind is not essential. This is because
different kinds of goods are in essence the same source of utility or productivity, though they
come in bundles of different sizes. If 2 apples are a substitute of 3 bananas, then a banana is just
2/3 of an apple. In an exchange, the goods are not substitutes. They are preferred unequally so
that one is bought while the other is sold. The reason exchange occurs is that each agent is able
to pay for a more preferred good with a less preferred one. One cannot make the transition to an
analysis of exchange without recognizing this distinction.
1.6.1.2  Degree of control over decision
The second distinction, between total and partial control, contains the seed of rationality of linear
and circular consistency. When an individual has complete control over the decision, it is rational
to abide by linear consistency, to reach the end of the line of preference. Thus if the arrowhead
shows the direction of preference, an individual rationally decides to sell the good at the bottom
end, and to buy the good at the top end. However, social choice can work only if the agents who
have no interest in a good as either buyers or sellers exit from the coalition that makes the
decision. This means that each agent has only partial control, in one segment of the circle. If an
individual has total control on social decisions, Arrow’s impossibility stops it from being
rational. Freedom of choice cannot exist if each individual’s preference is the same as that of
others. In that case, the whole concept of rational choice becomes irrelevant. Instead, if all
individuals have the same preferences, they might be regarded as nothing but inert objects with
immutable physical properties. A mechanism would describe their mechanical behavior. The
issue of gains would not arise at all in that case, as in physics.
1.6.1.3  Social integrity of choice
The third distinction between allocation and exchange concerns integrity of choice. An isolated
individual may optimally choose the quantity to buy, but the good’s quantity still lacks integrity.
This is because there is nothing to say if this demand is consistent with its supply from other
agents.  Similarly, the quantity of supply chosen by an isolated individual lacks integrity, withoutM Gani (220):The meaning of gainful trade 14
assurance of matching demands from others. Social choice must ensure the integrity of the
good’s kind and quantity. It means that the good’s quantity demanded is matched exactly by its
quantity supplied. This also means that the good’s kind is offered by the seller and accepted by
the buyer. The need to apply circular consistency becomes clear in regard to the determination of
the kind. The seller must have weak preference for a good, but the buyer has a strong preference
for the same good. Circular consistency in the double coincidence must exist to induce one to
sell what the other wants to buy, to confer integrity of the good’s kind.
The matching of the quantity hides the circularity in social choice. To the seller, the market value
is higher than the cost. To the buyer, the market value is lower than the cost of production the
buyer would incur if he or she had to produce. And yet they must be able to agree on a value of
the good to give it integrity. Separately, the seller and the buyer both obey linear consistency.
Together, their social choice has circular consistency. This circular consistency is the source of
the integrity of the good’s kind and quantity.
1.6.2  Entrepreneurial gains and losses
Exchange is an entrepreneurial action undertaken for the purpose of pure profit and does not
involve optimization. Allocation involves optimization, but does not involve entrepreneurial
gains or risks. Because the same individual may function in two different capacities, it is
necessary to separate them analytically. In Figure 1, Crusoe’s optimal choice before exchange is
to produce and consume at autarky equilibrium point A. It involves efficiency gains from any
other point on the PPF, but one does not presume which suboptimal allocation Crusoe might
have used before choosing the optimal. A rational Crusoe would never choose any other  point.
Hence the efficiency gain would not be part of the analysis.
However, when Crusoe becomes an entrepreneur, he seeks to break out of the constraint of the
PPF. His first move is to undertake a risk by moving to point B, which is suboptimal under
autarky. This move is entrepreneurial. An allocation  model can make no sense of such a move.
The next move is to consummate the actual trade itself. By selling  F
x and buying G
m, Crusoe
achieves a net gain. An allocation model looks at the budget line at world prices, and does not
see the gain, nor the risk of loss in case the trade failed.
The analytical problem is that the allocation model has no clue how the world price is
determined. Standard microeconomics makes a major mistake in this regard. On the one hand, it
presumes that the prices are already given, and the agents optimally choose demands and
supplies. But it then says that demands and supplies determine the price. This is not a valid
proposition. Demands and supplies determine only the quantity, but not the price. Something else
determines the price. That involves an entrepreneurial process that seeks pure profit and bears
risks of losses. An equilibrium market price is determined by entrepreneurial arbitrage, which
may leave pure profits or losses in equilibrium.
The conventional theory of price cannot be retained if gainful trade is to be admitted. In its place,
a new theory of price is needed. That theory will allow positive gains from trade. Chapter 3
presents such a theory. Its gist is that setting a market price is a dynamic process led by
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demands and supplies. In the second step, the arbitrageur clears the market by setting a price
such that demand becomes equal to supply in value, not in quantity alone.
This market clearing is formally accomplished by taking equivalence as a necessary condition of
exchange equilibrium. Equivalence is stated as the equality of value of the goods that pay for
each other in exchange. Thus since Crusoe pays for G
m with F
x, it must be the case that
V (F
x)  =   V (G
m) {Equivalence}
This condition imposes a constraint that the allocation model forgot. Chapter 3 discusses the
significance of this equilibrium condition and shows how to use consistency analysis to impose
this requirement. It avoids a major oversight in the standard multimarket model of allocation,
often mistaken to be a model of exchange. The allocation model requires that for each good,
demand must be equal to supply. This is a necessary condition, but not sufficient. It is further
necessary to ensure that each agent’s total income from sales must be equal to total expenses on
purchases. Furthermore, this restriction must be true item by item. Thus, suppose that Crusoe
sells fruits to many buyers. It is necessary that the value of fruits sold to any particular buyer be
equal to the value of  payment received from that buyer. It is possible that Crusoe sells fruits to
Defoe, but does not buy anything back from Defoe, but instead buys something from Eto to
whom Crusoe does not sell anything. This indirect trade messes up the budget balance and
disables demands from being effective. Without the equivalence condition, there is nothing to
impose the budget constraint.
Setting the market clearing price is the job of the arbitrageur. Crusoe may serve as an arbitrageur
on his own behalf or for others. He can buy cheap and sell dear. He can buy the fruits from
himself (at price equal to marginal cost, for example) and sell them to Defoe at a higher price.
The pure profit is without a constraint. It is not an optimization exercise. (See Chapter 3).
1.6.3  1F3 Artificial payments in indirect exchange
The allocation model apparently does not recognize the existence of a payment. The Walrasian
model has no money in it. It does not consider the issue of indirect exchange mentioned above
where Crusoe sells to Defoe but buys nothing from Defoe, while Crusoe buys from Eto but sells
nothing to Eto. Indeed, Arrow’s impossibility theorem denies the possibility of indirect exchange
implicitly, because of linear inconsistency in the preference orders. An exchange model must
allow indirect exchange and must find out how payments are made. The formal problem is to
acknowledge all of the following:
V (F
x)   =   V (G
m) {Equivalence}
   U (F
x)   <   U (G
m)      { Crusoe’s gains}
  U (F
x)   >  U (G
m)      { Defoe’s gains}
An analytical tool to acknowledge both equivalence and double coincidence may offer a
breakthrough. Things of equal value may have unequal utility only if they are of different kinds.
The analysis must find ways to study how the kinds of goods are determined, not just quantities.
The solution lies in formally articulating the preferences over different kinds of goods of the
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1.6.4  Intermediation
Since an allocation model is essentially individualistic, it has no room to talk about
intermediation between different agents. The attempts to study the buying and selling of
information products, or the various probabilistic modes of search can not handle the essential
character of entrepreneurship, or of transaction cost or of institutions as parts of intermediation.
This is because there is nothing to optimize.
A theory of exchange cannot avoid talking about intermediation in indirect exchange. It includes
issues of transaction cost outside the control of the producer and consumer. It covers
entrepreneurial discovery of gainful arbitrage and seigniorage opportunities that arise in
exchange. And it must address the issues of economic institutions. This is a virgin land with
exciting features. (See Chapter 6).
1.7  The journey ahead
The journey ahead is exciting. It discovers a simple tool to study exchange. The tool is applied to
reveal realities often unsuspected by previous economics.
The new discoveries bring a cheerful message. The proper use of money as a means of payment
can solve the problems of unemployment, indebtedness and instability. It basically accomplishes
the same entrepreneurial feat: create new wealth out of nothing, but by virtue of new knowledge
or gainful ideas.